

THE PEACE BETWEEN ATHENS AND PERSIA

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AFTER THE DEATH OF CIMON in Cyprus circa 449 B.C. (Thuc. 1.112.4) there were no hostilities between Athenian forces and Persian until 412 when the satraps of the Aegean seaboard are found supporting Sparta, and if Diodorus (12.4) is to be trusted, this cessation of hostilities was due to the making of a peace in 449 between Athens and Persia. In recent times, however, it has been claimed that much other evidence is to be understood as proving that peace, albeit short-lived, had been made after the battle of Eurymedon or at least that it later came to be thought that peace had been made. This interpretation of the evidence has been contested, and to my mind, successfully contested, and I do not propose to cover the same ground here.¹ For there is a clear indication that Athens did not make peace with Persia immediately after the battle of Eurymedon.

In the late 460s there was a general diplomatic realignment in Greece. The Athenians responding to Cimon's call "not to see Greece lame or Athens deprived of her yoke-fellow" (Plut. *Cim.* 16.10) had gone to save their ally, Sparta, at the time of the great earthquake (Thuc. 1.102.1), as indeed had other extra-Peloponnesian states, Aegina and Plataea being the two known to us (Thuc. 2.27.2; 3.54.5; 3.64.3; 4.56.2). Then when the Spartans dismissed the Athenians from the siege of Ithome the Athenians "gave up the alliance that had been made with them against the Mede" and became allies with the Argives, the Spartans' enemies . . ." (Thuc. 1.102.4). If Thucydides is to be trusted, it is inconceivable that Athens could earlier have made peace with Persia even if it was a very short-lasting peace, without thereby renouncing her alliance against the Mede.

The Hellenic League of 481 is a somewhat shadowy affair, but the contention of Brunt² that it was similar in form to the Delian League which was established so shortly afterwards is highly probable. Just as joining that league involved swearing "to think the same party friend and enemy" (ps.-Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.4), the usual formula of Greek leagues, so too in the Hellenic League the oaths

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¹ Meister (1982) argued that all the evidence pointed to a peace made after Eurymedon and that later events showed that there cannot in fact have been a peace. Badian (1993: 1-73) argued for two peaces of Callias. That article is so important to the whole of this article that I will not refer to it on particular points. Stylianou (1989) contested Meister's and Badian's interpretations, and I largely concur with him. The one piece of evidence, with his treatment of which I am uneasy, is the *Suda* s.v. Καλλίας (353), a somewhat odd piece of Greek, about which Badian seems to me correct. However, in view of the argument advanced in the second paragraph of my article this lexicographical note can only show what a late scholar thought had happened; whence he derived his idea is (*pace* Badian) beyond conjecture.

² Brunt 1993: 64-72.

would have bound participants to enmity against Persia, in Thucydides' phrase ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ (1.102.4; cf. 1.96.1). In both leagues common action was called for against enemies other than the Persians (cf. 1.107.5 for the Delian League), but Persia was the real enemy as the Mytilenians were to make plain (Thuc. 3.10.3). Once Athens had made peace with Persia, she could not continue in the Hellenic League. That Athens made peace with Persia, no matter how briefly, before her renunciation of her membership of that League is not to be seriously considered.

The chronology of the Pentecontaetia is almost all things to all men, but if one accepts Thucydides' ordering of events as generally reliable, this diplomatic realignment comes not only after the Eurymedon but also after the revolt of Thasos, the earthquake and the Helot revolt, events for which we are not without some outside chronological indications, and few will greatly demur at Gomme's date of 462/1 B.C. for the alliance between Athens and Argos.³ There cannot, therefore, have been a peace with Persia before that date.

It is commonly presumed, and to my mind rightly presumed, that the embassy sent by the Athenians to Artaxerxes in Susa which coincided with an Argive embassy concerning Argive relations with Persia (Hdt. 7.151) was itself concerned to discuss peace between Athens and Persia, that Herodotus' vague phrase "on other business" (ἐτέρου πρήγματος ἕνεκα) was an artful allusion to Athens' trafficking with the Mede. But there has been much division over a suitable context for such diplomacy. If Callias went to Susa once, he may well have gone on another occasion, even on several occasions. His descendant, Callias son of Hipponicus, boasted in 371 B.C. that he was on his third mission to negotiate peace between Athens and Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4); the family specialised in diplomacy. The role of our Callias may have resembled that of Antalcidas who negotiated with the Persians on behalf of Sparta on several occasions. So if a peace was indeed made in 449 B.C., Herodotus does not necessarily refer to that embassy.⁴ It is possible, as seems now not infrequently to be supposed, that the occasion in question was shortly after the accession of Artaxerxes in 465/4. Argos

³ Gomme 1945: 395. Cf. Badian 1993: 101.

⁴ There is however no evidence that Callias went to Susa in 449 B.C. According to Diod. Sic. 12.4, the whole negotiation was handled by the Persian commanders in the Cyprus area, and one may compare the role of Tiribazus in 392 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–15). Only when a major change of policy was sought was it necessary to go to Susa, as it was for instance in 367 B.C. (*ibid.* 7.1.33–38). In 449 B.C. an earlier embassy could have done the necessary work for a royal rescript to suffice for the negotiations of Persian commanders and Greeks. It may be added that the fact that Pyrilampes had peacocks on show for more than three decades (Antiphon Fr. 57 Blass) does not prove that it was in 449 that he had been on an embassy to the Great King (Plato *Chrm.* 158a), an "attractive and economical hypothesis" according to Davies 1971: 330; they could perfectly well have been given by one of the Persians concerned with the Peace in 449; indeed one might find that hypothesis more attractive than to have Pyrilampes getting down the Royal Road with two of these splendid creatures. One may also note that there is not a word in Demosthenes' remark (19.273) about the prosecution of Callias on his return from negotiating the Peace to suggest that he went to Susa. (The whole business

might well have wanted to secure the continuance of friendship with the Great King. But if Callias was there at that date, before Athens had left the Hellenic League, it is unlikely that he was seeking to negotiate a peace with Persia, nor, it may be added, is it likely that straight after the accession of the new King would the Argives be asking whether they were "considered enemies." Such a question was, of course, highly appropriate after the King's arch-friends, the Argives, had formed an alliance with the King's arch-enemies, the Athenians, just as it is no surprise that after Athens had left "the alliance made against the Mede" and had allied with the King's arch-friends, she should begin to discuss with Persia the making of peace. Certainty, of course, is not possible, but 462/1 B.C. is a very satisfactory context for an embassy to Susa led by Callias. It produced no immediate result. If Athens made the first approach, her terms may have been too much for the King to swallow at that date, but Athens would have shown that she was prepared for an alternative to war without end. Persia noted it and so did the Greeks, who saw the Athenians, in the phrase ascribed to the Mytilenian speaker by Thucydides (3.10.4), "giving up the hostility against the Mede."⁵ Abortive negotiations at Susa were promptly followed by a campaign against Cyprus and support for the rebel king in Egypt (Thuc. 1.104), but at least the King knew where Athens stood and future negotiations could be handled by satraps with clear terms of reference. A mere rescript sufficed in 449 B.C. (Diod. 12.4.4), just as in 392 Antalcidas needed to go no further than to the court of Tiribazus (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12).

There is, in short, no good case for a peace between Athens and Persia before Cimon's last campaign undertaken after he was recalled from ostracism, a campaign described by Thucydides (1.112) and by Diodorus (12.3 and 4). After that there was a cessation of hostilities. In 440, at the time of the revolt of Samos, a Samian, Stesagoras, led an embassy to solicit the aid of the Phoenician fleet (Thuc. 1.116.3 with Scholiast). Pericles took precautions, but the fleet did not appear. No satrap could have taken a decision to send a fleet if it was not in line with royal policy, and if there was no defined policy, he would have had to refer the matter to Susa, which could be quickly done. It is true that Pissouthnes, the satrap in Sardis, was said to have made an "alliance" with "the most powerful of those in Samos," who obtained seven hundred mercenaries from him, and hostages were lodged with him (Thuc. 1.115.4-5), but this hardly amounts to alliance in the

of settling the Peace in 449 could have been concluded within six weeks of the receipt of the royal rescript by the Persian commanders.)

⁵The tense of ἀνιέντας (Thuc. 3.10.4) is suitable for a period in which Athens, having begun talks about peace in 462/1 B.C., engaged in the First Peloponnesian War, which, despite help for the Egyptian rebels, became her chief concern. Cf. Thuc. 1.112.2 where Cimon's last campaign is introduced with the remark that "the Athenians abstained from the war against the Greeks." Cf. Stockton 1959: 66. But, of course, ἀνιέντας in no way excludes there being later a moment in time when Athens gave up her enmity and made peace.

formal sense, and in any case Pissouthnes was an independent-minded satrap, who would emerge in due course as an open rebel. There was no real attempt to save Samos in 440 B.C.; Persian forces did not engage with Athenian.⁶ So since hostilities ceased after 449, that is the obvious date to set the Peace, if a peace there was.

So one approaches the age-old question. Was Diodorus correct? Was a peace between Athens and Persia concluded ca 449 B.C.? Or was it all invented in the fourth century?⁷ (If it was, there is no point in seeking a suitable historical context, for it could have been inserted at any moment that suited the inventor's argument or humour.)

The cessation of hostilities is very striking and one might be inclined to take it as clear proof that a peace had been made. Perhaps before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War Persia might be supposed to have been disinclined to contest Athenian control of the Greek cities of Asia for fear of the Athenian navy, but after 431 B.C. that navy was much distracted, the Greek cities were unwarlike (Thuc. 3.33.2), and there was nothing to prevent the western satraps being required, as Tissaphernes would be in 412 B.C. (Thuc. 8.5.5), to assert Persian sovereignty over the whole of the Aegean sea-board. Time would show that the King's claim to the Greek cities was the irreducible minimum in all the negotiations between 412 and 387/6 B.C. What reason had he for not exploiting the new situation after 431 B.C., if it was not that he had bound himself in a peace? The period after the death of Artaxerxes which included the usual accession troubles of a new King was no time for Persia to take on Athens and after the Peace of Nicias Athens was again free from the distraction of the War, but between 431 and 424 what was there to stop Persia?⁸

Not only did hostilities cease after 449, but the Athenians seem to have known that the war was over. The reason for saying this is not so much the decree providing for the appointment of a priestess and the building of a temple for

⁶ Eddy (1973: 249–251) makes too much of Pissouthnes' part. He hardly "broke the treaty." For the revolt of Pissouthnes, Ctesias (*FGH* 688) F15 53. Efforts have been made to argue that Diodorus' account of Cimon's last campaign is a confused account of an earlier campaign and to assign the Peace of Callias, whether actual or a later invention, to the aftermath of the Eurymedon campaign. Cf. principally, Badian 1993: 21, 25. Diodorus was wonderfully good at messing things up and his sins are too heinous to need listing. His method in Books 11–15 is, however, plain enough. Into a framework provided by a chronographic source, he fitted chunks of epitomised narrative from his main source, here Ephorus. There presumably was an account in Ephorus of Cimon's last campaign just as there fairly certainly was the account of the Eurymedon campaign fragmentarily preserved on papyrus (*POxy.* 13.1610), but the two campaigns were distinguished by the different Persian commanders involved (cf. 11.60.5 and 61.3 with 12.3.2). So although each campaign involved both a land and a sea battle (Thuc. 1.100.1 and 112.4) and Ephorus may have confused details, he was quite clear about how the Peace of Callias was made and knew that it was made shortly after Cimon's death.

⁷ Meister (1982: 72) speaks of the Peace of Callias as "propagandistische Konstruktion" of Isocrates.

⁸ Of course Persia had, as ever, its internal troubles, such as the revolt of the satrap of Syria, Megabyzus (Ctesias F14 40), but there is no reason to think that Artaxerxes was long or seriously distracted from major military endeavours.

Athena Nike (*IG* I³ 35 = *ML* 44); the victory is presumably the victory over the Persians, but the date of the decree is much debated; it was probably in the 440s, as Meiggs and Lewis argued, but since the temple was not begun until the 420s,⁹ a later date for the decree remains possible; so it cannot be sure evidence that in the 440s the Athenians thought the war was over and that it was time for the celebration of the victory. The real indication is, to my mind, the so-called Congress Decree (*Plut. Per.* 17), by which Pericles summoned "all the Hellenes dwelling anywhere in Europe or Asia, cities great and small, to send to a congress in Athens those who would deliberate about the Hellenic shrines which the Barbarians burnt, and about the sacrifices which they owe after their prayers to the Gods on behalf of Hellas when they were fighting against the Barbarians, and about the sea, as to how all may sail it without fear and conduct the peace." If this decree is authentic, it was clearly drafted in the confident belief that the war was over.¹⁰ Yet in the period between Cimon's last campaign and the start of the building of the Parthenon there could have been no confidence that the Persians would not mount another expedition unless there had been a formal agreement of peace.

The arguments against the authenticity of the Congress Decree are, to my mind, not cogent, but if the reality of the Peace of Callias is to depend on acceptance of such disputed evidence, the prospect of convincing the scholarly world is distant indeed. Furthermore, Persian failure to exploit Athens' distraction between 431 and 424 B.C. might have been due to deliberate policy on the part of the King. In the Ionian War it was to be Persian policy to stand apart and let Athens and Sparta wear each other down. Thucydides would have it thought that Alcibiades was responsible for advising Tissaphernes to follow such a policy (8.46). Tissaphernes may not have needed such advice, and he may not have been the first to be content to leave Athens and Sparta to do their worst to each other.¹¹ That conceivably may have been the policy prevailing in the last seven years of Artaxerxes' reign, and one cannot confidently urge the Persian failure to move against the Greek cities of Asia as a proof that there was a constraining peace.

The most direct evidence for the Peace of Callias is provided by the fourth-century sources. It is commonly and airily asserted that since in 380 Isocrates (4.120) was unfavourably contrasting the Peace of Antalcidas with "the treaty made in our time" (or "under our empire") the Peace of Callias must have been invented to show up the shameful peace made by Sparta.¹² But this is a hardly credible motive. If the truth had been that for over sixty years Athenian naval

⁹ Cf. D. M. Lewis in *CAH* V² 119.

¹⁰ See appendix below, discussing Seager 1969. The brief discussion of Seager's article in Meiggs 1972: 514 is inadequate.

¹¹ It might be thought that Alcibiades would not have represented himself as urging such a policy if it had already been in place two decades earlier. But if it was applied in the early 420s, Greeks may not have properly appreciated the situation.

¹² Stockton (1959) does not question why the peace was "invented."

power had kept the Persians out of Greek affairs and that they had only returned when Sparta took to collaborating with them in the Ionian War, why not tell the glorious truth? If Athens had not “medised,” why pretend that Athens *had* “medised” but not as shamefully as Sparta? The invention theorists had better do better than that by way of finding a motive. Nor is the process of invention easily imagined. Did some wide-eyed politician propose, with winks to silence questioners, that “the treaty made in our time” be republished, or did he get the secretary to read out a false document? It is too easily assumed that such things were easily done. But in any case there was one man in Athens who was not, one would suppose, so readily to be duped, viz. Isocrates himself, born in 436/5 B.C. (Plut. *Mor.* 836f) and therefore free to attend the Assembly from 418/7. He may even have been present when the fateful decision was made to support the rebel satrap, Amorges, and the whole question of Athenian relations with Persia must at that time have been under discussion; but even if the young Isocrates was not present, it is hardly to be credited that he was not well aware of the issues. Such matters were no doubt constantly treated in the rhetorical training of his tutor, the Panhellenist Gorgias (Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 1). Isocrates spent his whole life in the service of Panhellenism, constantly preaching the necessity and the practicability of a Hellenic crusade against Persia, and if there had been no Peace of Callias, why did he not, consistently with his thesis, take the line that would be taken by Callisthenes (Plut. *Cim.* 13),¹³ viz. that it was Athenian might, not a peace-treaty, that had kept the Persians out of the Greek world? How and why was Isocrates duped? He knew too much and cared too much to have accepted “the treaty in our time,” if it was a fiction.¹⁴

Nor is that the only difficulty in the theory of an invention. The first mention of a fifth-century treaty with Persia is in Andocides’ oration *On the Peace* of 392/1 (29). If there was a treaty made with Darius II shortly after his accession,¹⁵ the allusion is to that treaty and the whole case of the sceptics is seriously damaged; for if Thucydides in the full narrative of Book 4 omitted that peace, his omission is so shocking that his omission of the Peace of Callias, though still amazing, is much weakened as proof that there was no such peace. But if there was no such peace with Darius,¹⁶ a very curious picture presents itself; for the Athenians must be supposed to have begun to invent a fifth-century treaty with Persia before the Peace of Antalcidas prompted the invention. It is true that the abortive peace

¹³ Cf. Bosworth 1990: 2–5, 13.

¹⁴ Meister (1982) neglects to explain why Isocrates “invented” the Peace. The contrast between *Isoc.* 4.120 and *Lys.* 2.55–57, on which he bases his claim that Isocrates invented the Peace, is hardly sufficient. Callisthenes may not have been the first to ignore the Peace and assert that Greek valour was responsible for Persian quiescence. Furthermore, when Isocrates called on the Athenians “to read side by side” (παράναγνῶσκειν) the Peace of Antalcidas and “the treaty in our time,” there must have been by 380 B.C. something for them to read. If Isocrates “invented” the peace in our time, one would like to know how a readable version was produced.

¹⁵ Theopompus (*FGrH* 115) F 153.

¹⁶ As Stockton (1959: 68) argued.

of 392/1 B.C. was very much a dress-rehearsal for the peace of 387/6, but to start inventing a "peace in our time" to discredit a shameful Spartan peace before that shameful peace was actually consummated is an unlikely process. The whole theory of an invention, both its motive and its process, is highly unsatisfactory. The fourth-century evidence is not so readily disposed of.

But what of Thucydides' silence on the matter? It is not just that he is silent about the making of a peace. If there was a peace made at the conclusion of Cimon's last campaign, it should have been recorded in chapter 112 of Book 1, but even if there was no such peace, some explanation was due for the withdrawal after the double victory in Cyprus not only from Cyprus but also from Egypt. It is the same at the other end. Nothing is said about Athens' decision to help the rebel Amorges. Whatever the reason for the resumption of hostilities between Athens and Persia, some account was due of when, how, and why Athens decided to support him. Instead the connection is somewhat mysteriously presented in Book 8 (19.2, 28.2, 54.3) and it is Andocides (3.29) who enlightens us.¹⁷ Yet the debate over help for Amorges should greatly have interested Thucydides, raising the whole question of relations between the imperial power of the Aegean and the imperial power of Asia. Whether or not the Athenian decision broke a peace with Persia, the omission is startling and serious. In Thucydides the importance of Persia is much underplayed. It is not just that he omits the Peace of Callias: he omits so much else that his silence is not only puzzling but also scandalous.

Opinion has divided on whether some sort of formal agreement is to be inferred from the final demand made by Alcibiades on behalf of Tissaphernes in the winter of 412/11 (8.56.4).¹⁸ One can well imagine that Alcibiades might be demanding that the Athenians should not contest the passage of the royal fleet along the King's own coasts because previously no passage had been attempted for fear of the Athenian navy, but it is hard to see why he was demanding that the King be allowed "to build ships" if there was not some formal restraint on his doing so. Persian fleets were built in places far away from Athenian naval control. Surely here the truth was momentarily unveiled. But there is no denying that Thucydides is amazingly silent about the whole Persian dimension of Greek history, a silence going far beyond mere treaties, and the ugly fact must be swallowed. Gone however are the days when the doctrine of the infallibility of Thucydides held sway, and fewer and fewer scholars now hold that what Thucydides did not recount did not happen.

So much for the silence of Thucydides. There is no need to spend time on claims that there were fourth-century writers who denied that there was a Peace of Callias. Callisthenes, it is now clear, did not deny that there was a Peace (Plut.

¹⁷ For the date of the decision to help Amorges, see D. M. Lewis, *CAH* V² 464–465. Westlake (1989) prefers to find Andocides guilty of fabrication rather than Thucydides at fault, in which preference others have not concurred.

¹⁸ Cf. Gomme, Andrewes, Dover 1981: 134–135.

Cim. 13.4).¹⁹ He simply did not record it. Theopompus in a famous fragment (*FG+H* 115 F154) discredited himself rather than the Peace; he declared it a fabrication because it was in Ionic lettering, as it would have been if it was republished when the Peace of Antalcidas was published.

What was said in the fourth century or not said in the fifth²⁰ should not destroy confidence in Diodorus' account.

In 427 "Ionia was unwall'd" (Thuc. 3.33.2). How and why was that so? But whatever answer one makes to that question, the absence of walls in Ionia is a strong indication that the cities were covered by the Peace of Callias.²¹ For what else was stopping the Persians reasserting control?

But how and why were the cities of Ionia unwall'd? Two explanations have been offered. The first is that of Wade-Gery, who postulated that a clause of

¹⁹ Bosworth 1990: 13.

²⁰ If Plutarch is not mistaken about the Congress Decree, it provides a fifth-century reference to the Peace as Wade-Gery (1958: 227, n. 2) remarked. He was followed in his understanding of τῆν εἰρήνην ἄγειν by Seager (1969: 134–135), who remarked only one case (Dem. 18.43) where he did not think the phrase referred to a particular Peace. Bosworth (1971: 608–609) seized on this passage of Demosthenes to argue that the phrase in the Congress Decree meant only "to remain at peace," and he also disputed Seager's interpretation of Dem. 8.4 f. On this he seems clearly wrong and even in regard to Dem. 18.43 he may have been victim of Demosthenes' arts. The Peace of Philocrates had involved Athens' allies as well (Dem. 19.159, Aesch. 3.74), i.e., "other Greeks" if not "the other Greeks" and it would have been easy for Demosthenes in 330 to claim that all the Greeks were in a similar position to Athens. Probably Seager is right. (If the Congress Decree is genuinely Periclean, it is, of course, quite irrelevant whether it accords with Plutarch's own usages, e.g., at Plut. *Per.* 23.2).

Herodotus had no occasion to deal with Graeco-Persian relations after 479 B.C., but, if there was a Peace of Callias, there are two passages which would have been full of meaning for those who had ears to hear. The first is his account of the Argive response to the Hellenic appeal of 481 B.C. (7.148–152), which contains not only the constantly cited ἐτέρου πρήγματος εἶνεκα but also the constantly unremarked mysterious remark of 152.2—if it was "not by the Argives that basest things have been done," who is Herodotus getting at? The climax of the passage which must be read as a whole is the report that "it was the Argives who summoned the Persian against Greece" (152.3). The dark allusion to Athenian medising is part of his careful attempt to excuse Argos; for if Argos medised in 480 B.C., in a sense Athens medised in 449.

The other Herodotean passage in which the topic of medising is much to the fore is 8.141–144. If there was a Peace of Callias, if Athens did indeed "make an agreement with the Barbarian" (ὁμολογήσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, 143.1), the whole passage would surely have made very curious reading. "Don't you try to persuade us to make an agreement with the Barbarian. We will not be persuaded" (143.2). If there was a Peace of Callias, the Athenians did later make an agreement, but Herodotus saves Athenian honour; their formal reply to Alexander (143.2) as to the Spartans was that they "would never make an agreement with Xerxes" (having made it with Artaxerxes). Nor would they ever "be willing to medise and enslave Hellas" (144.1); the Persian offer of 480 B.C. was rejected and the Peace of Callias, it was to be argued, in no way *enslaved* Hellas. Of course, no one could infer from this whole passage that there was a Peace, but if there was a Peace it was artfully written.

²¹ If Thucydides meant by "Ionia" strictly the cities of the Panionium, that should not be taken to mean that only those cities were unwall'd. At Hdt. 9.106.2 "Ionia" seems to be of wider signification, and at 8.86.4 Thucydides' "Ionia and Hellespont" seems to cover all the Greek cities of the western seaboard of Asia Minor.

the Peace required it.²² The second is that Athens required the cities to pull down their walls to discourage revolt and this is the explanation now generally proffered.²³ A choice must, if possible, be made. Our whole understanding of the nature of the Peace and of the relations of Athens and Persia is much affected.

In favour of the view that the Greeks of Asia had been required by Athens to pull down their walls for the sake of imperial discipline is the possibility that Athens regularly demanded the destruction of walls as part of the settlement of revolt in island states. Certainly Thasos seems to have been unwallled for fifty years (Thuc. 1.101.3, 8.64.3), and Samos was similarly treated (*id.* 1.117.3, 8.50.5). The walls of Mytilene were demolished at the end of the revolt (*id.* 3.50.1). Also, Athens may regularly have forbidden the building of new walls; the Chians were required to demolish "the new wall" in 425 (*id.* 4.51) and the Mytilenians in 428 were building walls as part of their last-minute preparations for revolt (*id.* 3.2.2). How Cos and Camirus in Rhodes came to be unwallled (*id.* 8.41.2 and 44.2) is beyond conjecture, but they may be the instances of a general rule which happen to occur in the narrative. So one might suppose that there is one and the same explanation for the absence of walls in Asia and elsewhere.

However, there was a difference between island and mainland cities. Because of Athens' control of the seas island cities could be safe enough from the attentions of exiles and dissidents, such as the Samians who established themselves at Anaea (Thuc. 4.75.1),²⁴ or the Mytilenians at Antandros (*id.* 4.52.2 f.). On the mainland, cities without walls would have been much more vulnerable, as indeed the cities of the Troad seemed likely to be when attacked by those same Mytilenian exiles (4.52.3). Plato remarked on the role of the Atticisers in the Empire (*Epistle* 7.332c) and none of them can have slept the more comfortably once the walls were down. Perhaps there was a good imperial case²⁵ for depriving large cities of the means to defend themselves, but what advantage was there for Athens in having Lampsacus (Thuc. 8.62.2), for example, or those small Aeolian cities on the mainland (*id.* 4.52.3) so easily entered by night and seized? And what of Myus, Priene, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, Erythrae, the minor cities on Herodotus' list (1.142)?

Being without walls had been the condition of the Ionians under the Lydian kings and at the approach of Cyrus in 544 they quickly put walls up (Hdt. 1.141.4), and it is to be presumed that when the Persians had captured them by siege (*id.* 1.162.2), they required their demolition. The proposal said to have been made

²² Wade-Gery 1958: 219–220.

²³ Meiggs 1972: 148–151 and Gomme, Andrewes, Dover 1981: *ad* Thuc. 8.14.3.

²⁴ See Hornblower 1991: *ad* Thuc. 3.19.2.

²⁵ Brunt (1993: 129 and n. 54) suggests "that it was only fortifications on the seaward side that did not exist, leaving the cities without defence against the Athenian fleet"—a curious notion, for cities were generally built at some distance from the sea and when Long Walls covered the way down to the sea, it was matter for special report. The demolition of the wall on the Pallene side of Potidaea (Thuc. 1.56.2) was exceptional, possible only because that city sat astride the isthmus.

by Harpagus during the siege of Phocaea implies the general rule. The wall of that city had been slowly and lavishly built (*id.* 1.163) and Harpagus declared that he would be content with the demolition of one redoubt and the dedication of a single house, a symbolic submission, but when later the Phocaeans who had left the city, returned and slaughtered the Persian garrison, they so planned and were able so to do probably because the walls had been demolished. Since walls could be quickly enough raised,²⁶ those who joined in the Ionian Revolt would have restored them, a point too obvious for Herodotus to mention, and the Persians had the task of recapturing the cities. Vengeance was severe. Demolition of walls doubtless accompanied the conflagration.²⁷ Thasos was required by Darius to demolish its walls (Hdt. 6.46), and one may presume that it was Persian practice. When Babylon was captured by Darius, he had both its gates and its walls removed (*id.* 3.159), and Deutero-Isaiah (45.1, 2) foresees the results of the coming of Cyrus in these words—"Thus says the Lord to Cyrus his anointed, Cyrus whom he has taken by the hand to subdue nations before him and undo the might of kings, before whom gates shall be opened and no doors be shut: I will go before you and level the swelling hills; I will break down gates of bronze and hack through iron bars." Not, of course, that all cities of the Persian Empire were unwallled or at least without gates. Such measures were for the punishment of rebels, a policy of open cities. The Ionians and Aeolians had, with the exception of Miletus, refused to cooperate with Cyrus and revolt from Lydia (Hdt. 1.141) and the loss of walls was one of the consequences. In this way for most of the hundred years before the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks in 479/8 B.C. (*id.* 9.105) subjection to the power of the hinterland had been symbolised and secured by their having no walls.

It is nowhere stated but may safely be presumed that the revolt of 479/8 involved rebuilding of city walls. By 427 B.C. all the cities of "Ionia," whatever Thucydides at that moment meant by that term, cities large and small, were unwallled. The hypothesis of Wade-Gery still seems to me stronger than the alternative.²⁸ If he was correct, one can well understand why Callias having negotiated the peace "that was on everyone's lips" was yet severely treated at the inquiry into his conduct of office (Dem. 19.273). Bribery was alleged, a routine and insignificant charge but essential if charges were to succeed (Hyperides 4.29 f.). What was he thought to have improperly conceded? The clause about demolition of walls could have been so viewed.

Why, it may be asked, does this clause concerning walls play no part in Diodorus/Ephorus' account of the Peace? "The Greek cities in Asia are all to be

²⁶ Messene was provided with a wall in 369 B.C. in eighty five days according to Diodorus (15.67.1), amazingly in view of the huge blocks used. Jerusalem was walled in fifty two days (Nehemiah 6.15). The walls of Athens were built in 479/8 in no great time evidently; otherwise Themistocles would not have got away with his delaying tactics (Thuc. 1.90.5-91.4).

²⁷ Hdt. 5.117, 122, 123; 6.25, 31.

²⁸ Pace Meiggs 1972: 150, the lines of Teleclides in Plut. *Per.* 16.2 could as well relate to action under the Peace of Callias as to an imperial decree.

autonomous" (12.4.5).²⁹ That is all. Time, however, would show that autonomy was susceptible of conditions. In the Peace of Nicias, six cities in the Thracian district were to be "autonomous, paying the tribute of Aristides' time" (Thuc. 5.18.5). In 395 B.C. Tithraustes proposed to Agesilaus that "the cities in Asia should be autonomous and pay the King the ancient *dasmos*" (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25). Earlier, in the terms proposed to and by Dercyllidas (*id.* 3.2.20) "autonomy" appears to be subject to conditions. So the assertion of 449 B.C. could well have been accompanied by the condition that the Greek cities should not be walled. There could even have been an assertion that Asia belonged to the King; with the assertion of autonomy that would have been a milder version from the Greek point of view than that of the treaty of 412/11 B.C. (Thuc. 8.58), where the King can "deliberate as he chooses about his own territory," but even before that (*id.* 8.56.4) it was "his own territory."

There is no explicit notice because, until Sparta had done very much worse in 387/6 B.C. and abandoned all claim to the Greek cities of Asia, the Peace of Callias was a source of some shame. Callias was fined (Dem. 19.273) and Herodotus could play on Athenian bad conscience (7.152).³⁰ For the truth was that the Peace of Callias was not the proclamation of a glorious victory, but a deal struck on the basis of the *status quo*. For Persia it was better and cheaper than the mounting of major expeditions every decade. For Athens, and Pericles, it saved the costly annual naval sweeps and removed the chance that sometime a great naval victory for Persia might bring down the whole imperial edifice. From the deal of 449 B.C., Persia steadily increased her influence, exploiting the great division of Greece. Whereas earlier the Great King had tried bribery to secure Spartan collaboration and failed (Thuc. 1.109.2), the Peloponnesian War set the Spartans seeking Persian help and Persia became ever more influential in Greek affairs.

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²⁹ Meister (1982: 70) asserted that this statement cannot be "historical," partly because it did not surface before Ephorus ca 345, whereas if it had been "historical," it would have been mentioned by Isocrates, and partly because he was persuaded that the King never gave up his claim to tribute from the Greek cities of Asia (cf. 38–42). This latter point has been much disputed, but since autonomy and tribute payment are later shown not to be inconsistent, an autonomy clause is perfectly possible in 449 B.C. whether the King claimed the right to collect tribute or not. Isocrates and others may have omitted the clause because the purpose of the orators was to glory in Athens' position and not to admit less glorious facts. Raaflaub (1985: 192) held that the Peace of Callias along with the autonomy clause was "more than questionable," but he did show that the term "autonomous" was established by about the middle of the fifth century (191 f. and 204). Such a clause in 449 B.C. is, therefore, credible. Whether one chooses to believe, however, depends on one's estimate of Ephorus.

³⁰ See above, n. 20.

APPENDIX: A NOTE ON THE CONGRESS DECREE (PLUT. *PER.* 17)

In a notable article, "The Congress Decree: Some Doubts and a Hypothesis," *Historia* 18 (1969) 129–141, R. Seager moderately laid out "obscurities and incongruities which ... hinder belief in the authenticity of the decree." His cautious statement has been widely accepted.¹ It is the purpose of this note to argue that his objections are not as compelling as has been supposed.

Seager first questions whether it is likely that the Greeks would have been summoned to deliberate about "the Hellenic holy places which the Barbarians burned." According to Diodorus (11.29), before the battle of Plataea the Greeks swore not to restore temples that had been burnt and destroyed, and Lycurgus (*In Leocr.* 81) reproduces the text. Is it likely that they were being summoned to break their oath? The Persians certainly made a habit of burning and destroying temples.² Herodotus specifically recorded the case of the temple of Apollo at Abae, but it is to be presumed that when the Persians burned the other eleven cities of Phocis (8.33), they did not spare their temples; that at Abae received special mention because it was "rich." Just as at the end of the Ionian revolt they had fired the temples of the Ionians along with their cities (Hdt. 6.32 and cf. 6.19.3), and in 490 B.C. they had done likewise at Naxos and at Eretria (6.96 and 101.3), so too in 480 those who did not conform received the same treatment;³ after Phocis, Thespieae, and Plataea (8.50.2), and above all Athens and Attica were not spared. The whole Acropolis was set ablaze, including the temple (8.53.2, 54); likewise the temple of Demeter at Eleusis (9.65.2) and, not mentioned by Herodotus, the temple of Hera on the road to Phalerum and in Phalerum the temple of Demeter (Paus. 10.35.2). In three of these places, according to Pausanias, the temples remained as the fire left them, memorials of Persian shame. But how widely was this the case? Herodotus would have it that the burnt temples were a burning issue in 479 B.C. (8.143.2, 144.2, 109.3) and represents Alexander of Macedon advising Mardonius to restore them (8.140a2). There is no reason to doubt that the oath was sworn. Until Athens began on the Periclean building programme, no work was done, it would seem, on the Acropolis.⁴ But somehow the restriction of the oath in that case was overcome,⁵ and that may have been quite widely the case. It is notable that Isocrates, referring in 380 to such an oath (4.156), spoke only of "the Ionians," though at what date they were free to swear it is unclear. The Greeks in general he quietly forgot. Had many of them released themselves, just as Athens certainly somehow did?

¹ Seager was followed by Bosworth (1971). In *CAH* V² D. M. Lewis preferred not to use the Decree (125, n. 19). Walsh (1981) argued against Seager. See Stadter 1989: 202.

² For Persian temple-burning outside the Greek world, cf. Hdt. 3.25.3 and 4.123.1.

³ The Phocians, for instance, withdrew to the mountains rather than submit to Persian rule (Hdt. 8.32.1).

⁴ Wycherley 1978: 69 and 106.

⁵ Just as the decision to invade the Megarid twice a year (Plut. *Per.* 30.3) was superseded (Thuc. 2.31.3. and 4.66).

It is not at all improbable that Pericles proposed a conference on the question whether the temples should remain in ruins for ever. After all, not only did the gods and heroes need their "houses" (Hdt. 8.143.2), the Greeks too needed their temples.

As to the sacrifices of which the decree speaks, "the only festival known to have been vowed by the Greeks *in connection with the Persian invasion* (my italics) is the Eleutheria celebrated at Plataea"⁶ but the war with Persia went on for another generation and there may well have been sacrifices owed to the gods arising from prayers in this period. We do not know how the practice of each member state sending an ox and a panoply to the Panathenaea began. The second decree on the stele recording the Assessment decree of 425 B.C. required it, but the emphatic position of the word "all" at the end of the clause suggests that the practice was well established and the newly-assessed states were being required to conform (ML 69, line 57).⁷ The obligation is alluded to in the Clinias decree of the early 440s (ML 46, line 41)⁸ in a way that suggests recent innovation. In this way Athens may have been discharging obligations which had been assumed after 478 and which Pericles may have been concerned with in the Congress Decree. Other states may have had similar obligations of which we are uninformed.

It is true that there is no formal clause in any treaty known to us concerning the checking of piracy before the Peace of Philocrates (ps.-Dem. 12.2). But there always had been piracy in the Aegean whenever there was no strong naval power to contain it.⁹ There is nothing in the least unlikely in Pericles fearing, or affecting to fear, the effect of the great diminution of naval activity that followed a cessation of naval hostilities against Persia. What he needed was a reason, or an excuse, for maintaining a strong naval presence in the Aegean.

It may also be true that the term for a peace favoured in epigraphic Greek in the fifth century was *spondai*, though apart from the treaty between the Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans and Eleans of 420 B.C. (Thuc. 5.47 = *IG* I³ 83) and the *spondai* with which Heraclides was involved in 424/3 (*IG* I³ 227), instances are lacking,¹⁰ while in Thucydides' text of the year's truce of 423 there is provision for deliberation concerning "the peace" (4.118.14), i.e., the Peace of Nicias in prospect. But not only do fifth-century speakers in the pages of Thucydides refer readily to "the peace" seemingly referring to either the Thirty Years Peace or some putative long-term settlement with Athens (cf. 1.120.2, 124.3 the Corinthians, 3.9.3 the Mytilenians, 3.54.3 the Plataeans), but also the last message of the Spartans in 432/1 B.C. is to be carefully noted (1.139.3). "The Spartans wish *the peace* to continue" It, therefore, seems absurd to say that the phrase of

⁶ Seager 131.

⁷ Mattingly (1961: 153) supposed that the amendment to this Assessment decree originated the practice, but see commentary on ML 69.

⁸ For the wrangle over the date of this decree see commentary on ML 46.

⁹ Ormerod 1924 and Ziebarth 1929 remain the standard works.

¹⁰ The Truces for the Mysteries (*IG* I³ 6) are hardly relevant.

the Congress decree "to conduct the Peace" is inappropriate language for the 440s.¹¹

Seager (1969: 138) also calls in question the phrase "to summon all Greeks who live anywhere in Europe or in Asia," a distinction which he supposes may well derive from the period of Spartan hegemony in the opening decades of the fourth century. The concepts of Asia and Europe are, however, constantly present in the mind of Herodotus. At 7.184.5 he speaks of the army from Asia and goes on (in 7.185) to talk of the army from Europe which included "the Hellenes from Thrace and the off-shore islands." So mention of "all Greeks who live anywhere in Europe or in Asia" could hardly have struck him as strange. One may particularly note that at 6.33.1 he lists the Hellespontine cities that are "in Europe." Thucydides too made the distinction (2.97.6), and one wonders by what term the Greek cities of Asia were alluded to in the Peace of Callias (and surely they must have been specifically mentioned) if not as in Agesilaus' truce with Tissaphernes in 396 B.C. and in the royal rescript of 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5, 5.1.31).

All in all, Seager's doubts do not make it incredible that Pericles should have proposed such a decree. His purpose could well have been to maintain Athenian naval power on which empire would depend and to inaugurate the building programme which would set the scene for Athens as the cultural centre of Hellas. He can have had no expectation that Sparta would play along or that the proposal would not founder in the Peloponnese, as it is said to have done (Plut. *Per.* 17.4). He was thus freed to be on with his grand designs.

As to the date of the decree, it seems to have been passed after the Peace was made and before the Periclean building programme began in 447/6 B.C. (cf. *IG* I³ 436). It has been argued,¹² and probably justly, that there is no reason for supposing that the decision to build the Parthenon was the *immediate* consequence of the failure of the Greeks to respond to Pericles' summons, that a considerable period of time may have elapsed between the two events. Walsh would have it that the Peace of Callias was made in 465/4 B.C. and so is emboldened to place the Congress Decree in 464/3, but as argued at the start of this paper the Peace cannot be set before Athens left the Hellenic Alliance against Persia. In Diodorus 12.3 and 4 it was made at the end of the campaign in the course of which Cimon died, i.e., ca 449 B.C. The Decree could have been passed straight after the conclusion of the Peace. Of the internal politics of Athens between then and the commencement of the Parthenon we know practically nothing, and there is no obstacle in the way of setting the decree in that period.

It is not possible, of course, to prove that the Decree is authentic or that Plutarch has not been deceived, but we can be fairly confident. He had declared

¹¹ Seager's doubts about the phrase "both small city and large" (136) do not merit discussion. The members of the Delian league were ἰσώνηφοι (Thuc. 3.11.4) and the phrase seems wholly apt.

¹² By Walsh 1981: 49–52.

that Pericles "left nothing in writing other than the decrees" (*Per.* 8.7). It is a reasonable guess that he found them in Craterus' *Collection of Decrees*, with which elsewhere he shows acquaintance (*FGrH* 342 FF 12, 13, 14).¹³ He certainly refers to Pericles' decrees frequently in the *Life* (10.4, 20.2, 25.1, 30.2–3, 37.3, as well as 17.1–3), and since the work of Craterus contained more than mere texts (cf. F12 = *Plut. Arist.* 26.4), the whole of Plutarch's chapter may well derive from him. Of course, Craterus in his turn may have been deceived but that may be said of practically anything written in the ancient world, and, until more persuasive arguments are adduced, there is no good reason for declaring that the Congress Decree is a fourth-century fabrication.¹⁴

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¹³ For Craterus, cf. Jacoby's commentary on *FGrH* 342. The view of Robertson 1976: 22–23 is not widely shared.

¹⁴ It is therefore needless to probe the various hypotheses of fourth-century fabrication, but it is to be remarked that there is one relevant consideration generally neglected, *viz.* that twice a year heralds went out from Athens all over Greece proclaiming the Sacred Truce. They surface in the evidence specifically only in 367 B.C. (Tod, no. 137) and 346 (Aesch. 2.133), but they will have dated from the regulation of the Mysteries in the first half of the fifth century (*IG* I³ 6) at the latest (cf. Pindar *Isth.* 2.23). The embassies sent "everywhere" "save to the Red Sea" by the decree of Eubulus (Dem. 19.10, 304) were usual enough; those sent through the Empire in 448/7 B.C. (*IG* I³ 34.22–28) were less comprehensive.

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